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Available online 2 March 2016AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to test the growing converging views regarding the destabilizing and growth-halting impact of interest-based debt
financial system. The views are as advocated by the followers of Keynes and Hyman Minsky and those of Islam. Islam discourages interest rate
based debt financing as it considers it not very conducive to productive activities and human solidarity. Likewise, since the onset of the crisis of
2007/2008, calls by skeptics of mainstream capitalism have been renewed. The paper applies a threshold regression model to Malaysian data and
finds that the relationship between growth and financial development is non-linear. A threshold is estimated, after which credit expansion
negatively impacts GDP growth. While the post-threshold negative relationship is found to be statistically significant, the estimated positive
relationship at lower levels of financial development is insignificant. The findings provide support to the above views and are hoped to guide
monetary authorities to better growth-promoting policy-making.
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For long, the fields of economics and finance have been
dominated with a wide-spread belief that a well-functioning
financial system is essential to promoting welfare and
growth in an economy. Though no causal influence was
inferred, such a belief first received empirical support from the
work of Goldsmith (1969), who found long-run economic
growth to be positively correlated with the size of the financial
system. This positive relationship was attributed to improved
efficiency in allocating savings to optimal investments, as
made possible by financial intermediation. Ever since,* The authors are deeply grateful to the editor (Prof. Ali Kutan) and two
anonymous reviewers for their learned comments which enhanced the quality
of the paper enormously.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).researchers have attempted to extend the body of knowledge
regarding the finance-growth nexus and provide further eval-
uation of its causal relationship.
Few views have emerged concerning the same. Pioneered
by Joan Robinson (1952), some economists argued that
financial development1is but a by-product of the overall pro-
cess of economic development. Others maintained that there
exists a positive causal relationship between financial devel-
opment and the level of economic growth (see, for example,
King & Levine, 1993; Levine & Zervos, 1998; Levine,
Loayza, & Beck, 2000).
However, a growing body of literature is questioning the
basics of the finance-growth nexus (what is a well-functioning1 A large body of theoretical and empirical literature is devoted to the
determinants of financial development. Among other things, financial develop-
ment is influenced by financial liberalization, legal frameworks, state-ownership
of banks, political stability and globalization (Law, Azman-Saini and Tan, 2014).
ting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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financial crisis with consequences far exceeding costly bail-
outs to lost economic output and social pain that is expected to
plague societies for generations to come. In particular,the
emerging research on the impact of financilization in indus-
trialized economies provides new emiprical support for
Keynes and Minsky's views on the destabilizing role of debt-
based financing.
Current trends in empirical and theoretical research are of
utmost relevance to advocates of Islamic finance; as they point to
the root cause of the crises; interest bearing debt-based finanical
system. Interest is prohibited by Divine prescriptions in Islam2;
for its destructive effects on human solidarity and productive
activities (Askari, Iqbal, Krichene, & Mirakhor, 2012; Chapra,
2007; Siddiqi, 2004). Such trends promise validation of
Islamic principles and growing convergence of views regarding
the demerits of contemporary market capitalism.
To this end, the study contributes toward investigating the
finance-growth nexus in a dual financial system and offers new
perspective to the relationship from the lens of the converging
views of Hyman Minsky, James Tobin and Islam.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: before
summarizing relevant literature in Section 2, a brief summary
of Minsky and Tobin's critiques of modern-day finance is
provided followed by the alternate perspective of Islamic
finance, as essentially serving the real sector of the economy
on the basis of risk-sharing. Section 3 presents the data. The
methodology and regression results are discussed in Section 4
and 5 respectively. Section 6 concludes.1.1. Minsky and Tobin's critiques of financialization and
the “paper economy”It may be worth diverging at this point to discuss the far-
sighted critiques of the emergence of the “Paper Economy”
and Financialization, offered by Minsky (1984) and Tobin
(1984); to better understand their implication on the finance-
growth nexus and set the discussion for a proposal of an
alternative Islamic financial system that is based on risk
sharing. The rapid growth of finance in industrial economies
went hand in hand with the development of the theory of
finance in the second half of the 1960s and 1970s, which
founded the platform for the introduction of derivatives and
securitization. By early 1980s, financial innovations have
changed the landscape of finance. It replaced traditional
banking-centered relationships with more innovative financial
arrangements and products that allowed greater access to
credit at cheaper rates (Rajan, 2005). As a result, the financial
system threatened to assume a life of its own, overtaking the
real sector of the economy. So alarming was this notion that
James Tobin proposed a tax to curb expanding financialization
and put a limit to the emergence of a “paper economy”:2 In fact, interest prohibition is not confined to Islam. Judaism, Christianity
and Hinduism have prohibited interest, too (Chapra, 2007). More than two-
thirds of the world's population subscribe to these religions collectively.… we are throwing more and more of our resources,
including the cream of our youth, into financial activities
remote from production of goods and services into activities
that generate high private rewards disproportionate to their
social productivity, a “paper economy” facilitating specu-
lation which is short-sighted and inefficient
Tobin, 1984.
The concepts of “paper economy” and “financialization”
are not distinct from one another. In fact, “financialization” is
described as the process where growth in the financial sector
exceeds the growth in the real sector of the economy by far; it
is the “decoupling” of financial activities from production of
goods and services, as in Tobin's words (Menkoff & Tolksorf,
2001). It was, indeed, the “paper economy” that collapsed in
the recent crisis of 2007/2008.
“Financialization” is characterized by the following: (i) the
rapid expansion of the offering and forms of financial in-
termediaries and financial transactions; (ii) the significant
growth of the financial sector in comparison with the real
sector of the economy; (iii) the harming rather than benefiting
of the long-term economic growth (Askari et. al., 2012).
As expected, the above characteristics are in line with those
of the “paper economy”, which are: (i) spread of speculative
rather than productive finance; (ii) short-termism, as man-
ifested in the rapid turnover of paper securities' trade3; (iii)
decoupling of finance from real sector activities; (iv) extract-
ing, rather than adding, value from the real sector of the
economy; (v) lack of anchor in real assets. It is, therefore, of
no surprise that “financialization” and the “paper economy”
are, in general, associated with a decline in the fixed capital
formation in the real sector of the economy; low economic
growth; widespread speculation in a ferocious search for yield;
heightened uncertainty and increased social injustices, among
others (Askari et. al., 2012).
The aforementioned form of finance, i.e. speculative
finance is central in Minsky's “financial instability hypothesis”
(see Minsky, 1984; Mirakhor, 1985). According to Minsky,
there are two financing structures: one promotes stability
while the other sows the seeds of instability the more a
financial structure tilts toward debt. The two phenomena are
not disconnected, but rather connected as “stability is desta-
bilizing” in Minsky's words.
Minsky holds that, in times of prosperity, businesses
finance their activities using internal funds and other sources
of equity finance. Borrowing is minimal, if any, and is vali-
dated by an underlying income stream sufficient to meet
obligatory payment of principal and interest, accrued over the
term of finance. This, Minsky refers to as “hedge finance”. A
system dominated by hedge finance is perceived to be stable.
As profit opportunities increase during prosperity and equity3 In light of this, the authors have applied similar Hansen threshold
regression analysis to a measure of stock market development, namely value of
stocks traded, and found a threshold after which the GDP is negatively affected
by increase in the trade of stocks. Results can be provided upon request.
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dertaking riskier investments. Resultantly, more and more debt
is incurred by enterprises, to the point where realized income
stream falls short of paying the principal due and it is rolled
over. Only interest payments are met. This is termed “specu-
lative finance”.
Debt-burdened firms continue to borrow to the point where
their debt commitments can only be honored by more
borrowing to pay both principal and interest. Minsky referred
to this financing as “Ponzi finance” and warned that massive
debt build up in the household and business sectors as well as
unchecked securitization; debt globalization; and financial
liberalization were but processes of forming bubbles in assets'
markets that threatened stability, fair distribution and struc-
tural employment in the debt-dominated financial system of
today.
The credit and debt creation process is facilitated by the
fractional reserve banking system and innovative financial
engineering, through the dynamics of credit multiplier and
leverage ratios. The latter ensure exponential growth of credit
during the upswing phase of business cycle4, creating asset
bubbles that inevitably burst during the downswing phase. A
number of Minsky's colleagues and students view the credit
crisis of 2007/2008 as a manifestation of a burst of a long-
forming bubble.
The above mentioned view regarding the social and eco-
nomic ills of debtecrediteinterest rate trinity echoes a number
of arguments from the Islamic perspective against interest and
rampant speculation. Next is a discussion of the same.1.2. Islamic view of financeThis sub-section is intended to introduce Islamic finance as
a viable alternative to the predominantly debt-based financial
systems of today. Islam is a rule-based system that prescribes
ways and means of human conduct in all spheres of life. Based
on 2:275 of the holy Qur'an, it has been argued that the
organizing principle of Islamic finance rests on two condi-
tions: al Bay’ (exchange) contract and no riba. The first con-
stitutes the necessary and second sufficient conditions that
render a financial system Islamic (Askari et al., 2012; The
Kuala Lumpur Declaration, 2012).
A pronounced testimony on the centrality of risk sharing
was given by Kuala Lumpur Declaration, where internation-
ally reputable Shari'ah scholars, renowned Muslim economists
and industry practitioners declared on September 20, 2012 that
“Shari'ah emphasizes risk sharing as a salient characteristic of
Islamic financial transactions”, with further clarification that
“this is not only exemplified in equity-based contracts, like
Musharakah and Mudarabah, but even in exchange contracts,
such as sales and leasing, whereby risk is shared by virtue of
possession.” Signatories denounced the practices of risk
transfer and risk shifting as violating Shari'ah principles.4 In a recent research, Benczu´r and Ratfai (2014) provide interesting key
facts about business cycles in developed and emerging market economies.The same view reverberated in Jeddah declaration in April
2013, where participants put forward recommendations to
strengthen Islamic finance regulatory and institutional frame-
works; and encourage more deliberated innovations in product
development, with the hope of actualizing risk sharing.
The range of instruments serving such a financial system is
expected to run the gamut from short-term, liquid, and low-
risk financing of trade to long-term financing of real sector
investments. At the lower end, the financial system would
provide financing for sales and purchases of goods and ser-
vices to allow aggregate demand stimuli and production
expansion, thus, higher employment of resources. At the
higher end, it would provide financing for capital formation;
all financed through risk sharing assuring the stability of the
overall economic system. There would be no room for spec-
ulation and Ponzi finance.5
For the system envisaged by Islam to be operational, certain
institutional scaffolding and rules of behavior must be in
place. These include property rights rules, faithfulness to the
terms and conditions of contracts and promises, transparency,
truthfulness, trust, rules governing the behavior of market
participants, and rules governing distribution and redistribu-
tion (Askari et al., 2012; Hussain, Shahmoradi and Turk, 2015;
Mirakhor & Askari, 2010; Ng, 2014).
Unlike risk sharing, other modalities of finance, i.e., risk
transfer and risk shifting, produce systems that are inherently
unstable and susceptible to cyclicality, as articulated by Tobin
and Minsky above. Risk transfer leads to banking crises that
destabilize the financial system. Risk shifting, on the other
hand, creates massive public and private debt that exhausts
consumers and producers' ability to sustain levels of aggregate
demand and GDP needed to validate debt claims.
Up until the middle of twentieth century, financial inter-
mediation was essentially involved in the transfer of risk
originating from finance (Rajan, 2005). Consequently, all
institutional arrangements within the present financial sector,
including the factional reserve banking system and central
banks' deposits' insurance scheme, were meant to facilitate this
function. These arrangements are detrimental to risk sharing.
As a result, the present form of Islamic finance itself, which
has grown out of conventional finance and uses many of its
techniques and instruments, “diverges markedly from its
paradigm version” (Errico & Farahbaksh, 1998, p.3).
2. Literature review
The relationship between financial development and eco-
nomic growth has been the subject of considerable debate
throughout the literature.
King and Levine (1993) were amongst the first researchers
to attribute a positive causal impact of financial development
on the level of economic growth. Their cross-country analysis5 Mirakhor (1990) has made a case that such a system would be capable of
generating high employment, income and economic growth along with stable
equilibrium.
66 A. Alaabed, M. Masih / Borsa _Istanbul Review 16-2 (2016) 63e71spanned 80 countries over the period of 1960e1989. They
used four indicators as measures of financial development;
namely: the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the ratio of de-
posit money bank domestic assets to deposit money bank
domestic assets plus central bank's domestic assets, credit is-
sued to non-financial private firms divided by total credit and
credit issued to non-financial private firms divided by GDP.
While the former study concentrated on financial devel-
opment arising from the banking sector, Levine and Zervos
(1998) advanced the research by considering both banking
and stock market development. Their results showed both
components of financial system to be important for growth.
More specifically, bank credit and stock market liquidity
positively predict economic growth on the back of reduced
transaction costs and information asymmetries and improved
resource allocation and capital accumulation.
Additional evidence for a causal link going from financial
to economic development was provided by Rajan and Zingales
(1998)6. They showed that technology-driven capital-intensive
industries grow relatively more in countries with a larger
financial sector.
Similar positive relationship was inferred by Levine et al.
(2000) using a mix of traditional cross-section, instrumental
variable procedures and dynamic panel techniques. Their
findings also suggested that strong legal and accounting sys-
tems are favorable for financial development and economic
growth.
Arestis, Luintel, and Luintel (2010) investigated the
finance-growth nexus using time-series technique and dynamic
heterogeneous panel estimator. They warned against pooling
cross-sectional data; as it risks concealing important cross-
country differences, and showed finance to have a significant
effect on growth e contradicting earlier evidence of an
insignificant effect of financial structure on growth proffered
by Beck and Levine (2002) using GMM techniques for dy-
namic panels.
Beyond the conventional measure of size, Cojocaru, Falaris,
Hoffman and Miller (in press) find that financial market effi-
ciency and competitiveness are more influential in spurring
economic growth in the former Communist countries of Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS) than credit to the private sector. The unique
sample comprised data from 25 transition economies (ten CIS
countries and 15 CEE countries) for the period 1990e2008.
Beck, Degryseb, and Kneer (2014) takes a different slant.
They assess “what concept of financial systemea focus on its
size, including both intermediation and other auxiliary “non-6 It is worthwhile to bear in mind that such earlier results may be attributed
to the time period used in the respective study, as financializtion and domi-
nance of the financial sector has especially picked momentum with the
beginning of millennium. In 1985, for example, there were only three coun-
tries in which credit to the private sector was greater than 100% of GDP,
namely: Singapore, Switzerland, and Japan. The US was closely following
with a ratio of 99%. By 1995 there were 14 countries in which credit to the
private sector was larger than GDP. Ever since, financial systems have expe-
rienced substantial growth (Arcand et al., 2012).intermediation” activities, or a focus on traditional interme-
diation activityeis relevant for its impact on real sector out-
comes?” Using a sample of 77 countries for the period
1980e2007, they find that traditional intermediation activity
promotes economic growth and moderates volatility in the
long run. No other concept of financial system is found to have
a long-run effect on the real sector.
Hitherto, the literature has focused on the single or com-
bined impact of financial development on growth during the
normal course of business. Less attention has been paid to the
relative importance of either components of financial system.
To this end, Gambacorta (in press) empirically investigate the
effect of financial structure (i.e. the mix of banking and mar-
kets) on economic growth. In particular, he poses the question:
how do economic systems that are more “bank oriented”
perform compared to “market-oriented” systems? He con-
cludes that bank-oriented economies tend to be more severely
hit when recessions coincide with a financial crisis.
However, the literature on the finance-growth nexus is not
free from contentions. A growing body of literature questions
the dominant view that more financial development results in
higher levels of economic growth a la Minsky (1984) and
Tobin (1984), especially in light of recurrent crises in coun-
tries with advanced financial sectors.
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), for example, find output
growth to be positively correlated with financial development
in high-income countries over the 1960e1985 period, but
negatively so over the sub-period 1970e85. They argued
negativity may have been caused by reaching a point after
which financial development no longer improves investment
efficiency ea point of turning into speculative finance
(Minsky, 1984)? e.Furthermore, Demetriades and Hussein
(1996) find no evidence of a causal relationship going from
finance to growth, using a sample of 16 countries and applying
time series techniques. Demetriades and Law (2006) make the
more nuanced observation that relationship between finance
and growth may be affected by institutional factors, such that
growth in countries with poor institutions may not be affected
by finance. Likewise, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) find that
finance has no effect on growth in countries with double digit
inflation. Furthermore, Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) report a
diminishing effect of private sector credit on GDP growth over
the 1965e2004 period.
Another skeptic of the cost-benefit of financial development
is Raghuram G. Rajan. In his widely-cited 2005 paper, he
explores the potential downsides associated with the devel-
opment of the financial system over the last 30 years and
warns of an increasing probability of a “catastrophic melt-
down”, on the back of distorted incentives' structure and riskier
appetite of financial intermediaries. More recently, Gennaioli,
Shleifer, and Vishny (2010) show that in the presence of some
neglected low-probability tail risk, financial innovation can
increase financial fragility even in the absence of leverage, due
to the sheer excessive volume of new claims. Such implica-
tions of the finance-induced volatility were earlier asserted by
Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2000), who empirically show that
there is a convex and non-monotone relationship between the
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estimates imply that output volatility starts increasing when
credit to the private sector reaches 100% of GDP.
In conformity with Tobin’s (1984) view, Deidda (2006)
develops a model in which the financial sector can have a
negative effect on growth as it leads to a suboptimal re-
allocation of talents away from the productive sectors of the
economy towards the seemingly lucrative financial sector.
Applying a threshold regression model to King and Levine’s
(1993) cross-country data set, Deidda and Fattouh (2002)
show that financial development has non-monotonic relation-
ship with economic growth. The relationship is positive but
statistically insignificant in low-income countries, with lower
level of financial development, and statistically positively
significant in high-income countries, where higher levels of
financial development are recorded. A threshold is also esti-
mated by Beck, Georgiadis, and Straub (2014), beyond which
the impact of finance on growth loses statistical significance.
Similarly, Rioja and Valev (2004) suggest that the rela-
tionship between financial development and growth may not
be homogeneous. It varies according to the level of financial
development. Using GMM dynamic panel techniques, a panel
of 74 countries is split into three regions. In countries with low
levels of financial development, financial markets have no
certain effect on growth. The relationship is a strong and
positive at intermediate levels of financial development, but it
weakens as the country develops further financially.
More recently and contrary to Rioja and Valev (2004) 7
finding of a positive, albeit small, effect of high financial
development on economic growth, Arcand, Berkes, and
Panizza (2012) show that the marginal effect of financial
development on economic growth becomes negative when
credit to the private sector reaches 80e100% of GDP. Using
country-level and industry-level data, they empirically inves-
tigate if there could be “too much finance”. Their findings
were affirmative and consistently so across different types of
estimators, namely: simple cross-sectional, panel regressions
and semi-parametric estimators. Robustness has been tested
after controlling for macroeconomic volatility, banking crises,
and institutional quality.
Interestingly, Bezemer and Grydaki (2014) find evidence of
the emergence of “paper economy” in the US and the
“decoupling” of financial activities from production of goods
and services. More specifically, they observe that credit
decoupled from output dynamics during 1984e2007 e also
known as the Great Moderation period. They attributed this
phenomenon to the spread of speculative rather than produc-
tive finance. They note that a “much larger share of credit
[was] allocated to asset markets during this period”. This
further validates Tobin and Minsky's propositions.
Therefore, the finance-growth nexus remains unresolved.7 Arcand et al. (2012) argued such a difference may have arisen from the
fact that Rioja and Valev (2004) set their threshold for the “high region” at a
level of financial depth which is much lower than the level for which the
former start to observe a negative effect of finance on growth.3. Data
Various measures of financial development are used in the
vast literature on the finance-growth nexus. One common
measure is that of credit extended by financial intermediaries.
In particular, we are to use the net domestic credit as a ratio
of GDP, in line with our interest to substantiate the impact of
financialization on economic growth. Net domestic credit is
the sum of net claims on the central government and claims
on other sectors of the domestic economy. The latter includes
gross credit from the financial system to households,
nonprofit institutions serving households, nonfinancial cor-
porations, state and local governments, and social security
funds8. Our measure is therefore comprehensive of credit
extended to the private sector as well as to government and
state-owned enterprises. It is worth nothing that credit to the
private sector alone has been preferred by some researchers
as opposed to credit to government and state-owned enter-
prises, as the former is argued to be more likely to spur
economic growth through its risk assessment and corporate
control capacities. It is also commendable to consider credit
extended by the financial sector as a whole, including
deposit-taking institutions and non-deposit taking in-
stitutions, as the role of the latter has increased significantly
since the beginning of the new millennium (Arcand et al.,
2012).9
Despite its potential limitation in face of increasing com-
plex innovations in the financial sector, credit remains one of
the consistent indicators of financial development.
Malaysian data are considered for our study. Malaysia
provides an interesting case study. The Southeast Asian
country enjoys a dual financial system, where conventional
and Islamic financial institutions operate in parallel. However,
Islamic finance in Malaysia is yet to achieve its “paradigm
version” (Alaabed, Masih, & Mirakhor, 2015; Bourkhis &
Nabi, 2013; Errico & Farahbaksh, 1998).
Islamic finance in Malaysia started with the enactment of
the Islamic Banking Act 1983 and the establishment of Bank
Islam Malaysia Berhad in 1984. From its humble single-player
beginning, Islamic finance has been transformed to a full-
fledged multi-player sector that spans Islamic banking, Taka-
ful and capital markets with a National Shari'ah Advisory
Council serving as the apex authority in Shari'ah compliance
matters, in the short span of three decades. Undeniably, Is-
lamic banking still has the lion's share of Islamic finance as-
sets. The 37 banking institutions currently offering Shari'ah
compliant products and services accounted for 25.6% of the
total banking assets in Malayisa at the end of 2014 (Lajis,
2015). This share is envisaged to reach 40% by 2020. The
Shari'ah compliant industry comprises 16 full-fledged Islamic8 The above definition is as per suggested by the World Bank database.
9 In fact, the same study gives the example of the United States, where the
emergence of a “shadow banking system” has resulted in total credit to the
private sector being almost four times larger than credit extended by deposit-
taking institutions.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
GDP DOMCRDT
Mean 9.35 86.50
Median 10.74 101.69
Maximum 41.83 163.35
Minimum 32.78 8.44
Std. dev. 10.99 50.09
Skewness 0.91 0.27
Kurtosis 7.03 1.63
Jarque-Bera 41.53 4.63
Probability 0.000 0.099
Sum 477.03 4411.51
Sum sq. dev. 6042.99 125463.20
Observation 51 51
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stitutions and three international Islamic banks.
Notwithstanding its early adoption, the present form of
Islamic finance has grown out of conventional finance and uses
many of its techniques and instruments. Therefore, it is not
immune from its shortcomings. More importantly, there is
evidence of risk shifting by Islamic banks in Malaysia
(Alaabed et al., 2015), which is not isolated from the fact that
“the present regulatory and supervisory framework for Islamic
banking serves a pre-dominantly risk-transfer financial system,
by virtue of its existence in a dual financial system10” (Lajis,
2015). The pioneering research further notes that “the pre-
sent framework unintentionally misaligns incentives and dis-
courages Islamic banks from fully embracing risk sharing.”
Having said that, the country is well-positioned for a
paradigm shift. It is hoped that the findings of this study would
provide insights for a new growth-promoting direction of
central bank's policy; as the country strives to become “a
developed and high-income nation by 2020” (UNICEF, 2011).
Malaysia needs a system that supports investments in the real
sector and fosters a more balanced income distribution on the
basis of risk sharing (Kuala Lumpur Declaration, 2012), inter
alia, given the fallibility of paper economies and their atten-
dant financial systems.
Annual time-series of GDP growth and net domestic credit
are sourced from the World Development Indicators, World
Databank, covering the period from 1961 to 2011. The ratio of
net domestic credit is calculated by dividing the value of net
domestic credit by the value of GDP. Table 1 shows descriptive
statistics of the variables of interest. The average GDP growth
is estimated to be 9.35% over the sample period. The more
volatile domestic credit averages 86.5% over the same period.
Fig. 1 is a graphical representation of the data. As expected,
the Malaysian financial sector, as all financial sectors around
the globe, witnessed rapid growth over the years. The ratio of
net domestic credit to GDP increased from 6% in 1960 to
almost 130% in 2011, having reached a peak of 163% in 1997.
In Tobin's terminology, the Malaysian financial system
assumed a life of its own, overtaking the real sector of the
economy. Of interest is the seeming divergence in the trends of
domestic credit versus GDP growth in 1971e1972, where
thereafter peaks of domestic credit seem to coincide with
troughs of GDP growth and vice versa11. Over the examined
period, the ratio of net domestic credit to GDP exceeded 100%
half the time. As such, the study includes 26 observations
(50% of the total) for which net domestic credit is greater than
100% of GDP.10 Research has shown that banking regulation and supervision are significant
determinants of banks' performance and moral hazard (Neyapti & Dincer,
2014; Ozkan, Balsari, & Varan, 2014).
11 This is later confirmed by the threshold regression model that finds a
domestic credit threshold of 24.45%, after which the impact of expansion in
domestic credit is negative on the GDP growth. The estimated threshold
matches the observed level of credit in 1971.4. Methodology12
This paper tests the presence of a limit to the widely
claimed growth-promoting property of the present form of
financial development, which may result in threshold effect
and asymmetrical response of the GDP growth to the domestic
credit ratio. The investigation has been performed using
threshold regression model. The primary contribution of using
this method is that data, and not the researcher, chooses the
threshold value.
Hansen (2000) proposed to use two-stage OLS method to
estimate threshold model. The model takes the following
form:
yi ¼ q01xi þ ei for qi  g
yi ¼ q02xi þ ei for qi>g;
where q is the threshold variable used to split the sample into
different regimes or groups; y is the dependent variable; x is an
m-vector of regressors and e is the error term.
At the first stage, the sum of square errors (SSE) is to be
computed for a given threshold. At the second stage, the
estimationof ðbgÞ is to be made by minimizing the sum of
squares.
An F test is then used, first, to determine if there exists a
threshold effect and to test the null hypothesis, such that:
FðgÞ ¼ ðSSE0 SSE1ðbgÞÞ=1
SSE1ðbgÞ=nðT  1Þ ¼ SSE0  SSE1ðbgÞbs2
If the null hypothesis is rejected, there exists a threshold
effect. Though, the existence of nuisance will result in the F
test statistic to follow non-standard distribution, Hansen (1999,
2000) suggested a “bootstrap” method to compute the
asymptotic distribution of test statistics using likelihood ratio
test in order to test the significance of threshold effect.
A bootstrap procedure attains the first-order asymptotic dis-
tribution, so p-values constructed from the bootstrap are
asymptotically valid.12 The description of the threshold regression model is largely drawn from
Caner andHansen (2004), Hansen (1999, 2000), andDeidda and Fattouh (2002).
Fig. 1. Malaysia's finance-growthdepiction.
Fig. 2. F-Test for threshold.
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form confidence intervals for g is to form ‘no-rejection region’
using the likelihood ratio statistic for tests on g. Hence, to test
the hypothesis
H0 : g¼ g0
H1 : gsg0
We calculate the following test statistic13:
LR1ðgÞ ¼ SSE1ðgÞ  SSE1ðbgÞbs2
Once again, the null hypothesis is rejected when LR1(g0) is
too large and the p-value is less than the significance level.
5. Empirical results
As far as our data are concerned, we use the
heteroskedasticity-consistent Lagrange multiplier LM test for
a threshold of Hansen 2000, to show that there is indeed ev-
idence for a threshold effect. The method allows one threshold
and one threshold variable. As such, the ratio of domestic
credit to GDP is chosen to be the threshold variable.
Furthermore, the p-values are computed by a bootstrap analog
since the threshold g is not identified under the null hypothesis
of no threshold effect. Using 1000 bootstrap replications, the
p-value for the threshold model was found to be statistically
significant at 0.005. This suggests that there might be a sample
split based on the ratio of domestic credit to GDP. The test is
depicted in Fig. 2.
Next, we estimate the model's threshold. Fig. 2 displays a
graph of the normalized likelihood ratio sequence LRg as a
function of the threshold in the ratio of domestic credit to
GDP. The Least Squares estimate of g is the value that min-
imizes this graph, which corresponds to g ¼ 24.45%. The 95%
critical value is also plotted, so we can read off the asymptotic
95% confidence set G*18.79%, 143.64%, where LRg crosses
the critical value line. These results show that there is13 Kindly note that this statistic is testing a different hypothesis from the F
statistic introduced above.reasonable evidence for a two-regime specification, but there
is considerable uncertainty about the value of the threshold.
By viewing Fig. 3, the confidence interval for g seems rather
wide. In fact, 78% of the observations fall in the 95% confi-
dence interval, and may not be decisively classified into the
first or second regime.bg splits the observations into two regimes depending on
whether the threshold variable is smaller or larger than the
threshold value ðbgÞ. The regimes are distinguished by
different regression slopes. In regime 1, where the domestic
credit ratio is below 24.45%, the estimate of DOMCrdt coef-
ficient is positive (0.093), but insignificant. In regime 2, where
the ratio of domestic credit is above 24.45%, the estimated
coefficient is a negative 0.168 that is statistically significant
at the 1% level, which implies that a 1% increase in the do-
mestic credit ratio will lead to a 0.168% decline in the gross
domestic product.
Table 2 represents the regression slope estimates together
with the White-corrected standard errors for the two regimes.
Hence, our estimated model is as follows:
Table 2
Estimates of the threshold model.
Regime 1 Regime 2
Constant 4.215 28.204
(8.528) (4.696)
DOMCrdt 0.093 0.168
(0.544) (0.042)
Observations 11 40
Degrees of Freedom 9 38
R-Squared 0.033 0.258
Fig. 3. Confidence interval for threshold.
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
4:215þ0:093DOMCrdttþ εt if DOMCrdtt 24:45
28:2040:168DOMCrdttþ εt if DOMCrdtt>24:45
We thus find that the finance-growth nexus in the case of
Malaysia experiences threshold effects and asymmetries;
challenging the wide-spread belief in the fields of economics
and finance. More specifically, levels of domestic credit cor-
responding to 24.45% of the GDP and above seem to divert
resources away from productive activities(Tobin, 1984). The
present financial system does not seem to satisfy the “well-
functioning” condition essential to promoting welfare and
growth in an economy. It is actually damaging. Any suggested
positive relationship at lower levels is not statistically
significant.
The findings lend credence to Minsky's financial instability
hypothesis. The ongoing build-up of debt in the Malaysian
household, business and government sectors clearly threatens the
economy and structural employment. Thefindings are also in line
with the emerging empirical evidence offinance's non-monotonic
relationship with economic growth (Arcand et al., 2012;Beck
et al., 2014; Deidda & Fattouh, 2002). However, our estimated
threshold is considerably lower than recent projections.
6. Conclusion
Ever since the crisis began, various explanations have been
put forward as to its causes. Of utmost interest to researchersin Islamic finance is the converging propositions that the debt-
based financial system potentially divert resources away from
productive activities, even in good times, and that it is inher-
ently destructive to long-term economic growth. In particular,
rapid credit growth is cited to increase macroeconomic vola-
tility or lead to financial and banking crises (Kaminsky &
Reinhart, 1999) which ultimately negatively impact growth.
Using Hansen threshold model, this paper was able to quantify
such a negative effect and show that, in the case of Malaysia,
the finance-growth nexus, indeed, experiences threshold ef-
fects and asymmetries once the level of domestic credit rea-
ches 24.45% of the GDP. Our threshold estimate is
considerably lower than the 80e100% range projected by
Arcand et al. (2012).
We believe that our results have potentially important im-
plications for financial regulation and direction of central-
banking, especially in a dual-banking system, like Malaysia.
The present financial system does not seem to satisfy the
“well-functioning” condition essential to promoting welfare
and growth in an economy. It, thus, provides a platform for
pushing Islamic financial reforms towards actualizing its risk
sharing essence. In the case of Malaysia, the analysis lends
credence to the timely enactment of Islamic Finance Services
Act (IFSA, 2013), which formally acknowledges risk sharing
in Islamic finance and attempts to operationalize it legisla-
tively. A formidable step away from the grips of risk-transfer
and-risk-shifting-destined path-dependency. Moreover, wide-
spread arguments against capital requirements and interest-
based lending restrictions, under the pretext of potential
harm to the economy, appear invalid as well as claims of
positive impact of present form of financial development on
growth. We find the latter to be statistically insignificant.
In contrast, an Islamic financial system, implemented in
accordance to the archetype model of the Holy Quran and
Prophetic Sunnah and one which is founded on the principles of
risk sharing will be immune to such detriment. With this
regards, future research may extend knowledge frontiers by
examining non-linearity and asymmetry in the relationship
between GDP growth and market capitalization of Shari'ah
compliant stocks, as a measure of risk-sharing based Islamic
finance. Moreover, future studies may wish to also consider
wavelet analysis in their research to assess the changes, if any, in
estimated thresholds over different time periods and horizons.
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